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The Mythical Speech of Janine Antoni 
Patrick L. Jones 
 
The confrontation of societal myths has been a major concern of many female 
artists since the 1960s. However, confronting the ideological construction of myth is not 
enough to discredit it. The semiology of myth, according to Roland Barthes (1915-1980), 
simply absorbs this confrontation by placing the artist in the position of a signifier of the 
myth itself. Paradoxically, in order to discredit myth the artist must “speak the myth,” in 
order to empty the ideological content of the myth through the adoption of mythical 
speech. This produces a counter-myth. Language as a vehicle of feminist expression has 
been a permeating issue central to 20th century women artists. However, their voices have 
often been silenced through the semiological structure of myth, unable to “speak the 
myth.”  
 
This paper addresses several works of art by Janine Antoni (b. 1964, Freeport, 
Bahamas) who is able to overcome the powerful semiological construction of myth 
through the use of mythical speech and the creation of the counter-myth. She does this 
through a pluralistic approach that often combines performance and the object, which 
historicizes the work of art, semiologically mythologizing the myth. In order to fully 
examine Antoni’s approach, a comparative analysis is necessary to determine the nature 
of myth and its relationship to visual art. Therefore, this paper begins by discussing three 
postmodern female artists: Sherrie Levine (b. 1947), Cindy Sherman (b. 1954) and 
Marina Abramovic (b. 1946). This approach establishes historical precedents of feminist 
art of the 20th century and attempts to reveal the various ways in which the semiological 
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     Preface 
“The fateful question for the human species seems to me to be whether and to what extent their cultural 
development will succeed in mastering the disturbances in their communal life by the human instinct of 
aggression and self-destruction.”1 – Sigmund Freud 
The work of New York based artist Janine Antoni (b. 1964) echoes this the last 
question posed by Sigmund Freud in Civilization and Its Discontents. Freed by the 
adoption of the postmodern deconstruction of the Text, Antoni often shifts aesthetic 
approaches and mediums in pursuit of her concerns. Antoni comments on these concerns 
by stating, “I feel attached to my artistic heritage and I want to destroy it.”2 However, this 
destructive impulse does not find fruition in the destruction of art but, rather, through a 
semiological construct that Roland Barthes refers to as counter-myth, Antoni inserts 
herself in this history transforming it into an interrogative that questions gender identity. 
Through a pluralistic approach that often combines performance and medium, Janine 
Antoni, abandoning the passive voice of the Text alone used by many appropriation 








                                                          
1 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents , translation by James Strachey 
 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1961), 92.  
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Introduction: Deconstructing the Text 
The modernist quest of originality and authorship no longer exists within today’s 
postmodern society. This critique may have originated as early as the 1960s with Pop art, 
and its inclusion of mass-media imagery. However, this critique surely found its fruition 
in the 1980s with the use of deconstruction, employed mainly in the form of 
appropriation. Appropriation artists went a step beyond Andy Warhol (1928-1987) and 
other Pop artists who simply referenced or crudely imitated mass media.3 Popular culture 
images, well-known art works, and even actual pristine commercial goods were often 
presented to a weary public without alteration.  For example, Jeff Koons (b. 1955) 
became well known during the early 1980s for his Hoover Deluxe series, in which the 
artist merely presented the vacuum cleaners with Plexiglas and fluorescent lights. The 
artist’s “touch,” which was the signature of the Abstract Expressionist, is completely 
removed through the re-presentation of the appropriated.  
Furthermore, the geometric abstraction of the minimalists is supplanted by the 
representational re-presentation of the appropriated, and art movements, including 
minimalism, were also appropriated visually. The postmodern aesthetic is a scavenger, 
which feeds upon the carrion of Modernism and the past. The original aims of the 
appropriated artwork are supplanted by those of the postmodern artist, without prejudice. 
The methodology of appropriation can be viewed as reflective of contemporary French 
philosophical thinking, which centered on deconstructing the subject. Caroline Williams 
provides a satisfactory working definition of deconstruction, stating, “[d]econstruction 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 RoseLee Goldberg, Performance: Live Art Since 1960 (New York: Harry N. Abrams,1998), 137. 
3 An obvious exception to this is Warhol’s Brillo Boxes, which were quite indistinguishable from 
the crude originals. The Brillo box series could be easily seen as an antecedent of the appropriation artists 
of the 1980s, many of whom no doubt looked toward Warhol as an exemplar of the postmodern artist.  
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may be best understood as an exploration, location and questioning of the conditions 
governing the possibility of conceptualization, together with a consideration of the 
historicity of meaning and modes of subjectivity which may support systems of 
thought.”4 One may immediately recall the work of David Salle (b. 1952), Sherrie Levine 
(b. 1947), Barbara Kruger (b. 1945) and Cindy Sherman (b. 1954). Like Warhol, these 
artists provide no conclusions within their work, but provoke a questioning of their 
subjects.  
Through the use of appropriated images and motifs, which provides an inherent 
repetition, the subject is eclipsed, or decentralized. This decentralization of the subject 
forces one to what the French deconstructivists, Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) and Roland 
Barthes (1915-1980) refer to as the Text. The Text, perhaps, can be best understood as 
everything that surrounds the subject. Derrida’s most profound statement speaks of its 
inclusiveness; “There is nothing outside the Text.”5 The Text is not a thing, but rather an 
action. An act of questioning facilitated by the semiological structure of the thing. Be it a 
word upon a page or an image, the signifier leads to the signified, and both are contained 
by the sign. Although simplistic at first, this type of analysis is quickly overrun by the 
Text, which has no finite possibilities.  
Without finitude the Text risks the status of mysticism. Western thought since 
Aristotle has focussed on deductive logic. Roland Barthes asserts that the Text is a 
methodological field.6 Rather than being a system of Aristotelian thought, which is 
                                                          
4 Caroline Williams, Contemporary French Philosophy: Modernity and the Persistence of the 
Subject  (New York: Atholone Press, 2001), 110.  
5 Jacques Derrida, translated by G. C, Spivak, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976): 158.  
  
6 Roland Barthes, translated by Stephen Heath, Image Music Text (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1977): 157. 
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reductive, the methodology of the Text is inductive. The Text cannot be reduced. To do 
so is to falsely limit it. Quantification of the Text is an illusion, which attempts to 
maintain the authority of the state and those who disseminate knowledge and ideas. To 
objectify the Text is to limit and quantify it - to maintain social control. Barthes warns 
against objectification, when he states, “[t]he Text is not to be thought of as an object that 
can be computed. It would be futile to try to separate out materially works from texts.”7 
An analogy can be made between the Text and the body. Just as the Minimalist 
artists attempted to engage the body through the foreign geometry of abstraction, the Text 
engages the mind through language, which is also a fabrication. Thus, we can find a 
phenomenology of the mind through the “physicality” of language itself. Barthes 
describes this when he states, “the Text is a process of demonstration, speaks according 
to certain rules (or against certain rules); the work can be held in the hand, the text is held 
in language, only exists in the movement of a discourse (or rather, it is Text for the very 
reason that it knows itself as text); the Text is not the decomposition of the work, it is the 
imaginary tail of the Text; or again , the Text is only experienced in an activity of 
production.”8 It is important to note that the Text, according to Barthes, is “held in 
language.” Language is where the Text manifests. It is “held” here; however, it is not 
necessarily confined to language.   
Certainly, there are aspects of the Text, which are ineffable, and although these 
aspects lack verbalization, language can merely retain fragments of the Text considering 
its infinitude. Perhaps, one can visualize this “movement of discourse” as an ephemeral  
                                                          
7 Roland Barthes, 156. 
8 Ibid., 157. 
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object. Imagine cupping both hands together under a running faucet. The water “held” by 
the hands is similar to the Text “held” in language. The moment the faucet is turned off 
and the hands parted the “activity of production” ceases, and the “experience” of the Text 
is terminated. However the Text remains and this activity enriches the work, rather than 
decomposing it. The next chapter will explore the approach of the conceptual artist, 



















Chapter One: Sherrie Levine and the loss of “play” 
The work of Sherrie Levine of the 1980s embraced this aspect of the text through 
her appropriated images. Re-photographing well-known photographs by white male 
modernists, like Edward Weston, Levine with her photograph Untitled (After Edward 
Weston), 1981 (Fig. 1) forced discussion away from the subject. The image was not 
augmented in any deliberate way. Weston’s image of his son Neil was copied faithfully 
by Levine. Levine’s and Weston’s photographs are identical to one another. Levine forms 
a doppelganger of Weston’s original photograph. Her work does not attempt to “pass” as 
the original. The title provides attribution of original authorship by stating the work is 
“After Edward Weston.” Levine’s photograph is the fearless doppelganger. Without 
disguise or affectation, Levine’s photograph asserts its “inauthenticity.”  Such a work 
evades traditional criticism through its blatant, unapologetic plagiarism. Formal 
characteristics of the image presented were of no consequence, since she did not make 
those decisions. The subject of the photograph is de-centered. This left the formalism of 
Clement Greenberg (1909-1994) in the dust of the postmodern critique of originality and 
authorship. The viewer can only question why the image was presented to the viewer.  
Levine confronts both originality and authorship through plurality. Barthes writes, 
“The Text is plural. Which is not to simply say that it has several meanings, but that it 
accomplishes the very plural of meaning: an irreducible (and not merely the acceptable) 
plural.”9 Just as the Text is plural, so too is Levine’s object. The object of the photograph 
is not one of singularity, but one of plurality. Its plurality is limited to produce value. It  
 
                                                          
9 Roland Barthes, Image Music Text, 159. 
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too is not a medium of originality, but a medium of the copy. To place limits upon 
its duplication is to assert a social control upon the object and reflects society’s need for 
authorship to place limits upon the Text. Barthes comments upon the use of authorship, 
when he explains, “[t]o give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it 
with a final signified, to close the writing.”10  By imposing a limited singularity upon the 
photograph its authorship is reinforced, and through this reinforcement the Text is closed. 
The Text is closed via an explanation as Barthes relates by stating, “[t]he explanation of a 
work of art is always sought in the man or woman who produced it, as if it were always 
in the end, through the more or less transparent allegory of fiction, the voice of a single 
person, the author ‘confiding’ in us.”11 
The photograph produces a semiological paradox according to Roland Barthes. 
Levine through her reproduction of the Weston “original” makes apparent this paradox. 
The photographic message is a mechanical analogue, and as such it can be described as 
denotative, without a code. However, it too has qualities, which we may call connotative. 
Being connotative, the photographic message is one with a code, that is “an object 
worked up, selected, composed, constructed, treated according to various professional, 
aesthetic, or ideological norms[.]”12 Thus, it is with the connotative that artistic meaning 
is manifested from the denotative, the visual analogue. Roland Barthes succinctly 
explains this paradox, when he states, “[t]he photographic paradox would then be the co-
existence of two messages, one without a code (this would be the photographic analogue) 
and the other with a code [this would be the ‘art,’ or the treatment, or the “writing,” or the 
                                                          
10 Ibid., 147. 
11 Roland Barthes, Image Music Text, 143. 
12 Roland Barthes, translated by Richard Howard, The Responsibility of Forms: Critical Essays on 
Music, Art and Representation, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), 7. 
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rhetoric of the photograph]; structurally, the paradox is not of course the collusion of a 
denoted message and a connotative message: this is the probably inevitable status of mass 
communication; the paradox is that the connoted (coded) message develops here from a 
message without a code.”13 
    Sherrie Levine emphasizes this paradox of the photographic through her 
reproduction of the analogue, the denotative message. Furthermore, Levine pairs Barthes’ 
paradox with one of her own making. She places emphasis upon the selection of the 
original photograph as subject. When Barthes speaks of selection as an attribute of the 
connotative, he no doubt is referring to the actual object photographed. Levine’s object is 
the original photograph, which already denotes a subject. However, it would be odd to 
think that Levine has photographed the photograph as an object of selection, because it is 
not placed within the context of other objects, which would have reinforced its 
objecthood. Instead, she has photographed the subject of the original, which is 
paradoxically its object. 
Levine places an emphasis, then, on the denotative qualities of Weston’s original 
photographic message through the choice of the subject-object of the original. There is a 
temptation to “read” Levine’s photograph in terms of the artist’s gender, which seems to 
inform her selection and its inherent connotative message, the code. Otherwise, the 
photograph lacks a code, and in lacking a code the work is without a message. To do so is 
to place authorship over the work itself, and provide a claim of authority, which would 
limit and close the Text. Ironically, this makes Levine’s photograph “tyrannically 
                                                          
13 Ibid., 7-8. 
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centered on the author, his [or her] person, [and] his [or her] tastes.”14 However, the work 
being without the code becomes its “code.”  
The work itself is, perhaps, intended to be without a “meaning.” To have a 
singular meaning would be to close the Text. It is simply a commodity, and this was the 
artist’s intent. Levine comments on her intention of commodification as the dominant 
“text,” when she states the following: “My works were never intended to be anything but 
commodities [.] The work is in a dialectical relationship to the notion of originality. 
Originality was always something that I was thinking about, but there’s also the idea of 
ownership and property...what does it mean to own something, and, stranger still, what 
does it mean to own an image?”15 Through Levine’s proliferation of Weston’s original 
photograph, repetition becomes a theme of the work, and through this idea of repetition, 
Levine shifts the viewer’s attention away from the depiction and toward the art object’s 
relationship with a capitalistic system, in which governments and systems of authority are 
established to protect property.  Furthermore, the work demonstrates the continuous 
redefinition of “property” within the ever-expanding parameters of capitalism.       
Through second hand repetition of the “original,” Levine’s work facilitates active 
participation with the Text by placing emphasis on the denotative aspect of the 
photographic message. Roland Barthes refers to this participation as “play.” This is not a 
reading or an interpretation of the “text”, which would be consumptive, but a dualistic 
action. Barthes writes that “ ‘[p]laying’ must be taken here in all the polysemy of the 
term: the text itself ‘plays’ (like a door that ‘plays’ back and forth on its hinges; like a 
                                                          
14 Roland Barthes, Image Music Text, 143. 
15 Jeanne Siegel, “After Sherrie Levine,” Art Talk: The Early 80s, edited by Jeanne Siege(New 
York: Da Capo Press, 1990), 251.  
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fishing rod in which there is some ‘play’); and the reader plays twice over: he [or she] 
plays at the Text (ludic meaning), he [or she] seeks a practice which produces it; but so 
that this practice is not reduced to mimesis (the Text being exactly what reduces this 
reduction), he [or she] plays the Text [.]”16  Levine’s photograph “plays” with notions of 
originality, commodification and ownership within a capitalistic society. 
The question that now dominates Levine’s work is does her act of making or 
remaking constitute a mimesis of the works of others, reducing her own “play” with the 
Text. This is not to imply that her work does not employ postmodern concepts and ideas, 
but rather to question if her methods limit her own experience with the Text. The work 
itself is not a mimesis of the photograph, but rather, to use Jean Baudrillard’s term, a 
simulation of the original, attesting to its hyperreality.17 Nevertheless, Levine’s lack of 
process and, most importantly, the abstract singularity of the photograph reproduced 
diminish “play.” If Levine’s work’s lack of “play” diminishes the Text, then is “play” the 
solution, or can too much “play” be detrimental to the Text? In the following chapter, this 
notion of “overplaying” the Text will be explored through the work and approach of 





                                                          
 
 
16Roland Barthes, translated by Richard Howard, The Rustle of Language, (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1986): 62-63.   
17 Jean Baudrillard, “The Hyper-realism of Simulation,” Art in Theory 1900-1990: An Anthology 
of Changing Ideas, edited by Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (Maldin, MA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd), 
1049-1051. 
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Chapter Two: Cindy Sherman “overplaying” the Text 
The inverse of this dilemma is seen in the photographic work of Cindy Sherman 
(Fig. 2). Beginning in the late 1970s, while still a graduate student, Sherman began 
inserting herself into her photographic compositions in an effort to combat stereotypical 
images of femininity produced by America’s mass-media culture and exploited by both 
Madison Avenue and Hollywood. With Untitled Film Still #3 (Fig. 2), 1977, Sherman 
presents herself in a kitchen with its usual items: dish soap, pan, salt, etc. Within the 
asymmetrical compostition of this black and white photograph, Sherman’s half-length 
body and portrait are awkwardly cropped. She appears to be ominously looking over her 
shoulder at someone or something beyond the picture format. This ambiguity provides 
theatricality to the image. The suspense created and the achromatic nature of the medium 
is reminiscent of a thriller by Alfred Hitchcock. Is Sherman an actress playing a role? Or 
is this a commentary on the “role,” or portrayal, of women in film. Although one may 
have the impression that this is a specific scene from a specific movie, Sherman’s 
inspiration remains private, in order to widen the scope of criticism.  
The construction of her photographic narratives may provide a disproportionate 
amount of the artist’s “play,” which places emphasis on authorship and diminishes the 
Text. Sherman is best known for her self-portraits. However, within these photographs 
the artist attempts to remove the “self” from the portrait. The represented self is not her 
own, but rather one based upon prototypes of femininity. Sherman’s involvement with 
the stereotypical guise of femininity (often undertaken), according to RoseLee Goldberg, 
is performance. Goldberg describes these early performances and their methodology, 
when she wrote the following: “Dressed up as a housewife or a clerk in an unemployment 
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office (and one as a well-known art collector), she would pass unnoticed at museum 
openings or at her job as a receptionist in a downtown New York gallery. Later, she 
would photograph herself in various outfits in her small bedroom studio.”18  
Unlike Levine, Sherman is a direct descendent of the female performance work of 
the 1960s and 1970s and its emphasis upon the role of the Body Politic. Many artists, 
such as Marina Abromavic, Yoko Ono and Carolee Scheemann, placed an overwhelming 
emphasis on their individual bodies as the conduit for meaning. This emphasis upon the 
physical body of the artist is not something new. Actually, such an emphasis can be 
traced back to Jackson Pollock and the objectives of the so-called Action Painters of the 
1950s. Bodily engagement is made visible in these paintings through the application of 
the paint. Harold Rosenberg focused upon this performative aspect of Action painting, 
when he stated the following: “What matters is the revelation contained in the act [.] 
Since the painter (artist) has become an actor, the spectator has to think in a vocabulary 
of action: its concept, duration, direction—psychic state, concentration and relation of the 
will [.]”19 Finding such a connection between female performance work of the 1960s and 
1970s with the work of the stereotypically macho action painters may seem incongruent 
at first. However, such a connection seems to exist. The role of the body is paramount in 
both. As Paul Schimmel aptly states from the following passage: “The move from an 
uncontrolled action of the wrist to the more dramatic sweep or gesture of the arm, which 
required the artist to move around canvas rolled out flat on the floor, altered both the  
                                                          
18 RoseLee Goldberg with foreword by Laurie Anderson, Performance: Live Art Since 1960 (New 
York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1998), 201. 
19 Harold Rosenberg, “The American Action Painters,” Art in Theory 1900-1990: An Anthology 
of Changing Ideas, Edited by Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 
1993), 581-582. 
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traditional concept of what a painting was and how one could be made. Pollock’s 
activities portended the dissolution of the boundaries between the object and the activities 
of its making.”20 If one thinks progressively, then it seems that Pollock’s work questions 
the need of the object. Afterall, Pollock’s process seems to override the importance of the 
object produced, making it merely a commodity. The next chapter will explore this 
notion of removing the object, central to performance art of the 1960s and 1970s, by 
focusing upon the performance-based process of Marina Abramovic (b. 1946) seen in a 















                                                          
20 Paul Schimmel, “Leap into the Void: Performance and the Object,” Out of Actions, Between 
Performance and the Object (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1998), 19. 
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Chapter Three: Marina Abramovic and the body politic 
The critical difference between female performance art of the 1960s and 1970s 
and action painting is not simply the removal of the object, but the active examination of 
the body politic. Susan Bordo clearly describes the body politic, when she states the 
following: “The body—what we eat, how we dress, the daily rituals through which we 
attend to the body is medium of culture.”21 If the body is a medium of culture, then who 
determines the construct of the body? This is the question that dominated feminist 
performance art of the 1960s and 1970s. Many of these artists sought simply to expose 
the body politic through the performance. Marina Abramovic, for example, performed a 
work entitled Rhythm O in 1974. In this work, the artist remained passive for six hours in 
a gallery in Naples, during which the viewers/participants were free to use any of the 
various instruments of pleasure or pain upon the artist without her resistance. Within this 
state of self-imposed vulnerability, the artist revealed the depravity and heroism of 
humankind. Her clothes were cut off with the provided razor blades. One man cut her 
face with a razor blade and like a vampire began sucking her blood. A protective group 
developed, and when the loaded revolver was thrust into her face, a fight broke out 
between the two groups of viewers/participants.22    Abramovic’s passivity and 
vulnerability ignited a sociological spectacle examining the role of power.  
Most interesting, the viewers/participants tolerated a great amount of degrading 
behavior and did not act until the artist’s life was threatened. This demonstrates the status  
                                                          
21 Susan Bordo, “The Body and the Reproduction of Feminity,” Writing on the Body: Female 
Embodiment and Feminist Theory, edited by Katie Conboy, et. al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997), 90. 
22 Thomas McEvilley, “Marina Abramovic/ Ulay Ulay/ Marina Abramovic,” Art Forum 13, no.1 
(September:1983): 52. 
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of the woman within Western culture. The female performance artist, like any female 
performer, exists for the pleasure of the audience, no matter the depravity, and only when 
mortality is placed in the forefront do others come to her aid. The behavior of the 
viewers/participants of Rhythm O is not representative of anarchy; rather it represents the 
norms of the body politic and woman’s diminished and relatively insignificant role. 
Woman exists for pleasure. Furthermore, the conditions of the performance constitute a 
silent speech on the artist’s behalf, placing the viewers/participants into uncertain roles, 
which attempts to dislocate the body politic. Moira Gatens describes two strategies to 
silence those who dare to speak in a voice other than the one sanctioned by the body 
politic. She states, “The first is to “animalize” the speaker, and the second, to reduce her 
to her ‘sex.’”23 In Rhythm O both strategies are demonstrated, the first action performed 
unto Abramovic is the removal of her clothing, which is an attempt to reduce her to her 
“sex.” Such actions as the sucking of her blood “animalizes” the artist, making her the 
physical object of nourishment. Through passivity the artist reveals the strength of the 
body politic and the levels of depravity and sadism necessitated to protect it. Cindy 
Sherman’s photographs are, by contrast, an attempt to “play” the body politic by rejecting 
passivity and “constructing” the identity. However, these “”constructed” identities are not 
original creations by Sherman but, rather, products of the body politic. The following 
chapter attempts to determine whether Sherman’s “play” is singular, or if it translates into  
“play” for the viewer of the work.  
 
                                                          
 
23 Moira Gatens, “Corporeal Representation in/and the Body Politic,”  Writing on the Body: 
Female Embodiment and Feminist Theory, edited by Katie Conboy, et. al. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997), 84. 
 11
Chapter Four: Cindy Sherman’s re-enforcement of the Text 
Cindy Sherman’s private or discrete performances of identity rely upon both the 
body politic for subject and content. Sherman’s actions, however, do not challenge the 
norms and mores of the body politic. Instead, they simply seem to record them through 
the photographic medium. This makes clear that Sherman’s engagement with the “text” 
through “play” is greater than the viewer’s participation with the photographic record of 
her performance. Sherman “plays” the body politic. However, her “play” does not 
translate into a “play” for the viewer. Her stereotypical guises are selected by the artist, 
and it is through this selection that the artist “plays” with the body politic. The viewer, 
however, is excluded. Sherman does demonstrate the authority of the portrait within 
Western civilization, and in this sense the body politic is engaged in a fruitful way. Ernst 
Van Alphen explains the authority of the portrait within the Western canon by stating, 
“[t]hus, authority is not so much the object of portrayal, but its effect. It is the portrait 
which bestows authority on an individual self.”24  
The documentation of her work through the photographic medium is also not 
performed in the same manner as that of female performance artists of the late 1960s and 
1970s. Not functioning as a detached tool, the often-large prints provide intent beyond 
documentation. The resulting image is carefully composed, and unlike Levine’s 
photographs of known photographs, the aesthetics of the image can easily be analyzed 
through formalist methods. In referring to Sherman’s early work, Goldberg notes that the 
photographs had the shared aesthetics of ‘60s French films and Hollywood B-movies.25 
                                                          
24 Ernst Van Alphen, “The Portrait’s Dispersal: Concepts of Representation and Subjectivity in 
Contemporary Portraiture,” Portraiture: Facing the subject, edited by Joanna Woodall (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1997), 240. 
25 RoseLee Goldberg, 201. 
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Thus, unlike Levine, whose formal concerns had been eliminated through her 
reproduction of the reproductions, Sherman’s have been largely nullified by the aesthetic 
qualities of the photographic document of her performance. To approach the “text” of 
Sherman’s work, authorship of the image and its circumstances must be considered. This 
is paradoxical to the aims of postmodern deconstruction, which avoids authorship. As 
previously stated, Roland Barthes described the author’s relationship as tyrannical.26 And 
he goes on to write the following: “The author is nothing but one who writes, just as I is 
nothing but the one who says I: language knows a ‘subject,’ not a ‘person’ [.]”27  To spite 
the questioning of the historical portrayal of women in film, Sherman distances the Text, 
not in her performative acts, but in her documentation of them as art-objects, and her 
attachment to authorship.  
Failing to employ the Text in its entirety does not discredit the artistic efforts of 
Sherman and Levine, but demonstrates the elasticity of myth. These artists were building 
a new vocabulary for artistic expression based not on Modernist fallacies of originality 
and authorship, but rather one based in epistemology. This intense questioning of 
“norms” and their representations fostered later artists’ interests in postmodern strategies 
of embracing the Text. Christopher Reed in his assessment of the emerging art of the late 
1980s poignantly states that it is “[n]o longer the modernism that sublimated social 
concerns in a rhetoric of spiritual abstraction, neither is it the equally abstract play of 
social signifiers that was celebrated by the postmodernists ten years earlier. One logical 
outcome of the move away from abstraction and toward specificity is autobiography.”28 
                                                          
26 Roland Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 50. 
27Ibid., 51. 
28 Christopher Reed, “Postmodernism and the Art of Identity,” Concepts of Modern Art: From 
Fauvism to Postmodernism, edited by Nikos Stangos (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1997), 288. 
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Although the autobiographical content of the newly developing works of the late 1980s 
and 1990s would seem to conflict with the postmodern death of the author, it does not 
simply due to its attachment to the art-object produced, which embodies the actions of the 
biography. Neither Levin nor Sherman engaged autobiography as a strategy for 
embracing the Text. To do so may have seemed an attachment to authorship and fixed 
identity that both artists were attempting to avoid. Paradoxically, autobiography has a 
potential to distort myth by injecting the individual into its history. To effectively employ 
autobiography in the work, the artist must resist structuralist notions of self, a series of 
absolutes, and engage post-structural modalities.  The following chapter attempts to 















Chapter Five: Structuralist v. Post-structuralist myth 
An important artist to emerge in the 1990s whose complex work embraced 
identity as a defining characteristic was Janine Antoni (b.1964). She employed strategies 
of appropriation and performance without the conflicts of “play” experienced by Levine 
or the distancing of the Text experienced by Sherman. Unlike Levine’s and Sherman’s 
well known works of the early 1980s that share an “abstract play of social signifiers” that 
Christopher Reed previously mentioned, Antoni’s work is attached to a “type” of 
biography, one of her actions and experiences during the production of her artworks. Her 
work engages the Text in an attempt “to name an identity and the mechanism of 
oppression that structures it.”29  
Antoni’s work also rejects the passivity to the Text that was prevalent in the early 
1980s, pursuing, instead, an active role in its formation. She does this through the 
creation of what Roland Barthes terms “myths.” His deconstruction of French “myths” 
during the 1950s led to his understanding of the semiological structure that supports 
ideology. Simply put: “Myth is a type of speech.”30 Myth, as Barthes uses the term, is a 
structure of ideology that has political meaning.  A structure found within the language of 
expression. Barthes’ poststructuralist  form of myth is different from the structuralist one, 
which is best exemplified by the work of Claude Levi-Straus. Levi-Straus adheres to the 
binary structure of myth, which is to say that it is composed of opposites. A thing 
represented is good or bad, sacred or profane, positive or negative, and so on. Levi-Straus 
explains the use of binaries applied to myth, when he states, “[a] myth appears as a  
                                                          
29Christopher Reed, “Postmodernism and the Art of Identity,” 288.  
30 Roland Barthes, Mythologies (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), 109.   
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system of equations in which the symbols, never clearly perceived, are approximated by 
means of concrete values chosen to produce the illusion that the underlying equations are 
solvable.”31 Levi-Straus’ description exemplifies his use of binaries to describe the 
universality of myth, including those, which are not Western and may not be based upon 
binary codes. Nevertheless, this structure is imposed to quantify myth, and in doing so 
the Text of the myth is limited. Levi-Straus places a philosophical positivism upon myth 
to define, and limit, its language.  
Thus, it may seem illogical to conflate myth and the Text, if one accepts that myth 
is based upon codes, which, in a way, deceive the reader. No doubt within Western 
culture myth has been a tool of politics, no matter its form. Myth historically has 
performed a necessary societal function. Levi-Straus explains this function as being a 
way to ease anxiety, stating the following: “A solution that is not a real solution to a 
specific problem is a way of relieving intellectual uneasiness and even existential anxiety 
when an anomaly, contradiction, or scandal is presented as the manifestation of a 
structure of order that can be perceived more clearly in aspects of reality that are less 
disturbing to the mind and the emotions.”32  
Taking Levi-Straus’ description into account, it comes not as a surprise that 
Barthes finds myth in opposition to the Text. This opposition takes the form of 
authorship. Barthes describes this conflict, when he states, “we know that to give writing 
its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost 
of the death of the Author.”33 The false solution that myth in its traditional context  
                                                          
31 Claude Levi-Straus, The Jealous Potter (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 172. 
32 Ibid., 171. 
33 Barthes, Image Music Text, 148. 
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provides is one that relinquishes authority to the Author. The Author may not simply be 
an individual within a society, but may be the society itself, the state. Myth within its 
traditional context imposes meaning upon the representation of all things, which threaten 
the intellectual and existential reality of the world view, and it is in this way that myth 
strangles the Text, in order to preserve, maintain and dictate societal norms and mores. 
What makes Antoni’s use of “myth” quintessentially postmodern is a questioning of 
societal norms and expectations for femininity and her use of art historical precedents, 
both visually and conceptually to convey these ideas with the subtlety of “language.”  
If myth suppresses the Text through its authorship, then how is it possible for 
Antoni’s work to successfully conflate the two, without negating both? Conflation does 
not necessarily bring about negation. The very idea that this would occur demonstrates 
the prevalence of binary thought even today, in an age of the postmodern. Through the 
juxtaposition of the Text and the structure of myth, Antoni is able to achieve a plurality 
through her absence, which may be read as a refusal of Authorship. A refusal of 
Authorship in turn is a refusal of society’s myths. Thus, a paradox is created. Barthes 
actually supports the destruction of myth through mythmaking. A process, which at 
seems at first to be hypocritical, but with further reflection it is simply paradoxical. 
Because myth is so resilient, Barthes suggests that the only means to combat it is by 
forming a counter myth. Barthes states, “[t]ruth to tell, the best weapon against myth is 
perhaps to mythify it in its turn, and to produce an artificial myth: and this reconstituted 
myth will in fact be a mythology.”34  
                                                          
34 Roland Barthes, “Myth Today,” reprinted in A Barthes Reader, Susan Sontag, editor (Hill and 
Wang, 1982),123. 
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Perhaps, an examination of myth in both the structuralist and post-structuralist 
forms is necessary to further explore the possibility of such a conflation of myth and 
Text. The structuralist form of Levi-Straus views myth as a series of incomplete codes 
from various sources within the society to create the myth. In regard to this, Levi-Straus 
states the following: “Imagine a text (the physical form of writing), difficult to 
understand in one language, translated into several languages; the combined meaning of 
all the different versions may prove richer and more profound than the partial, mutilated 
meaning drawn from each individual.”35 Levi-Straus, then, views myth as pluralistic, in 
that it draws from many sources. Barthes, however, would disagree. Within Barthes view 
this multiplicity of codes simply reduces the source of the myth to a singularity, which is 
palpable. The authority of a myth is placed with the author who is presented as 
possessing an omnipotence and omniscience. 
Barthes view is metalinguistic and much more complex than the structuralist 
view, which reduces myth into a complex series of binary codes. The post-structuralist 
view of myth is a semiological system in which myth is manifested through a second-
order system that feeds off the first system. Barthes explains this, when he states, “[b]ut 
myth is a peculiar system, in that it is constructed from a semiological chain which 
existed before it: it is a second-order semiological system. That which is a sign (namely 
the associative total of a concept and an image) in the first system, becomes a mere 
signifier in the second.”36 The second-order system of post-structuralist myth is precisely 
why any avoidance of authorship is thwarted. Cindy Sherman attempts to disrupt  
                                                          
35 Claude Levi-Straus, 171. 
36 Roland Barthes, “Mythology Today,” reprinted in A Barthes Reader, Susan Sontag, editor (Hill 
and Wang, 1982),99. 
 18
authorship and identity by portraying herself in multiple guises. However, the second-
order system places her actual identity in the position of signifier for the myth. The 
following chapter discusses how myth creates the Author, in order to place Sherman, the 
actual person, into the position of second-order signification, thus distorting her content 




















Chapter Six: And the myth absorbs Cindy Sherman 
 Returning to the work of Cindy Sherman, it is possible to see both the resilience 
and essential structure found within the post-structuralist view of myth, which makes it so 
formidable. In many of her self-portraits, Sherman takes on the guise of a stereotype of 
femininity. With Untitled Film Still #3 (Fig. 2), 1977, Sherman associates the female 
body with domesticity by placing herself in the setting of a kitchen. The viewer assumes 
to have just been interrupted by something or someone beyond the frame. She appears 
wide-eyed and frightened by that beyond the frame. Furthermore, she seems defenseless 
as though she is careful not to be seen by the other. Within this constructed photograph, 
the image of Sherman appears helpless and vulnerable. By inserting herself within the 
myth of the stereotype of helplessness and vulnerability, Sherman attempts to destabilize 
it. However, it can be argued that she is absorbed by the myth through this second-order 
signification. Rather than adding herself onto the semiological chain to create her own 
myth, the opposite seems to occur; the chosen myth of stereotyped femininity places her 
portrait in the first-order semiological position and continues the semiological chain from 
that point, and in a sense Sherman’s actual identity is supplanted by the Author, which 
represses the Text.  
Sherman’s attempt to reveal the myths of femininity as false is countered by the 
very structure under attack. The second-order system of myth enables the myth to 
respond in a flexible way, shifting order at will. Sherman’s actual identity being 
presented is paramount to exposing the myth. However, by placing her identity into the 
first position of the semiological chain, the myth simply absorbs her identity into the role 
of mere signifier for the myth itself. Sherman’s actual identity is emptied and replaced 
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with the guise of the Author. A myth cannot be exposed; it is transparent in a sense. It is 
in many ways the societal norm. Barthes describes the difficulty of revealing the 
falsehood of myth, when he states, “[i]t thus appears that it is extremely difficult to 
vanquish myth from the inside: for the very effort one makes to escape its stranglehold 
becomes in its turn the prey of myth: myth can always, as last resort, signify the 
resistance which is brought to bear against it.”37 Thus, Sherman is reduced to Authorship, 
and her actual identity within the stereotypical image becomes a novelty, which serves as 
a signifier of the myth, and not the signified. Rather than being a critique of the myth of 
women as helpless and vulnerable, the image (Fig. 2) represents the inverse due to 
Authorship. The image of Sherman affirms, or signifies, the myth here, and Sherman, the 
person, becomes an object as well, signifying a radical, a fringe element (a thing), to be 
tolerated but dismissed in a democratic society. This is a means on the part of myth to 
discredit the Author, in order to uphold the myth. 
Myth as an semiological structure is, therefore, consumptive of all attacks waged 
upon it. To simply identify the myth to be questioned is to empower that very myth, with 
all criticism simply absorbed and reflected backed to the casual reader in the form of a 
signifier, which reaffirms the myth. This does not mean that myth is beyond reproach. On 
the contrary, myth is subject to its own system of secondary signification. Barthes 
explains, “[a]ll that is needed is to use it (myth) as the departure point for a third 
semiological chain, to take its signification as the first term of the second myth.”38 This  
                                                          
 
37 Roland Barthes, “Mythology Today,” reprinted in A Barthes Reader, Susan Sontag, editor (Hill 
and Wang, 1982), 123. 
38 Roland Barthes, Mythologies (New York, New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), 135. 
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production of a newly formed, reconstituted myth seems to have been the objective of 
both Levine and Sherman; however, the original myth was not countered simply because 
it was directly confronted by the artists. Neither was able to escape the semiological 
position of the Author. The myth confronted is not diminished, but instead embellished as 
myth reduces both artists to their sex. Authorship becomes a signifier for the myth itself.  
Sherman’s and Levine’s  actual identities as living persons are emptied by the myth.  
What emerges from their work is not a “text” of feminism, but rather a myth in the guise 
of a “text.” The reduction to Authorship closes the Text and signifies the myth. . 
The problem of mythology is indeed quite complex. However, the possibility of a 
“counter-myth” is not a hypothetical solution to the problem of myth on the part of 
Barthes. It simply requires the paradoxical approach of mythologizing the myth. The 
language itself, “mythologizing myth,” seems to be a rhetorical affirmation of the myth to 
be challenged. However, this is not true. On the contrary, by utilizing myth as a signifier, 
the role of the Author does not eclipse the criticism by forming a myth in the guise of a 
“text.” Instead, Authorship (sex) becomes an actual “text,” not closed, but open to the 
plurality of the Text.  
The problem for the artist attempting to discredit a myth is the distortion of 
Authorship, no matter one’s gender, race, ethnicity, age or place of national origin. If 
myth is confronted, that person is reduced to the signifier of the myth in the form of a 
“text,” which is a self-affirming guise of the myth. Myth is a deformity. It simply distorts 
the person into the role of the signifier. This seems to be amplified with women artists. 
The body politic defends myth, and as previously mentioned when analyzing 
Abramovic’s performance entitled Rhythm O from 1974, the female artist is reduced to 
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her “sex.”39 By reducing the female artist to her “sex,” the body politic objectifies the 
person. This objectification allows myth to reduce identity. This reduction of identity 
through objectification, in turn, permits myth to distort the person into the Author, 
closing the Text through a “text,” which is really the original myth. Authorship 
paradoxically discredits the female artist, limiting her identity to a stereotype, which 
signifies the “radical,” the “dismissive,” the “hysterical,” reaffirming the myth. In order 
to counter myth, one must engage it from the side and with ambiguity and a conceptual 
anonymity. Inserting oneself into the myth or relying on Authorship as a means of 
discrediting myth at best creates an anomaly.  
Myth simplifies and makes reality digestible to the casual reader. Myth is a 
semiological system of empty signifiers and a sign, which is full: the myth. By directly 
encountering myth through gender and identity, the desired relationship is inverted by the 
myth, forcing a passivity of the signifier upon the artist.  For example, Sherman places 
her own, real identity as a counterpoint to various myths of femininity, taking on various 
disguises, but the end result is that her actual identity is reduced to an empty signifier of 
the myth. Her identity is semiologically reduced to Authorship, which closes the Text. 
This occurs through confusion on the part of the artist. Ideology is confused with 
semiological reality.40  Barthes explains by stating that “[l]anguage is a form, it cannot be 
realistic or unrealistic. All it can do is be either mythical, or not, or perhaps...counter-
mythical.”41  
To avoid Authorship, which is tyrannical to the Text, one must not confront myth. 
However, this seems to conflict with artistic strategies that attempt to expose the 
                                                          
39 Moira Gatens, 84. 
40 Barthes, Mythologies, 136. 
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falsehood of myth. To mythologize in return, to deform the myth, seems to accept the 
falsehoods that it represents. However, this thinking is ideological, not semiological. The 
gender of the artist must be ambiguous, and through this ambiguity, the myth is unable to 
deform, but must be deformed in return. Perhaps, one may initially be inspired to find 
representational androgyny as a feasible solution. However, myth functions with binaries. 
It simplifies. An androgynous image or maker would simply be given a sexual identity 
through Authorship or context. The image or maker would be subjugated into the role of 
male or female, and thus, the myth would distort the image or maker into the position of a 
signifier of the myth. Since myth seems born of binaries, the maker of the counter-myth 
must simultaneously be both known and anonymous. Identity must not become fixed in 
its representation. In the next chapter, the issue of how rigidity of identity can be avoided 
will be explored through the examination of Janine Antoni’s 1992 composite work, 
Gnaw: Chocolate Gnaw (Fig. 3), Lard Gnaw (Fig. 4) and Lipslick/ Phenylethylamine 
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Chapter Seven: Janine Antoni’s Gnaw        
Janine Antoni, like many contemporary artists, employs a pluralistic approach to 
her art making, which avoids a fixed artistic representation of individual identity. She 
does not restrict artistic efforts by either medium or process. Her work ranges from 
performance to photography. However, her most intriguing work, which has been 
referred to as “interperformance,”42 encompasses both the performative aspect of Cindy 
Sherman and the direct appropriation of Sherrie Levine, without distancing the viewer 
from the “text,” or diminishing “play” through a singularity of appropriation. 
Furthermore, by directly involving herself, bodily, in the manifested object, Antoni 
provides the performance-based art object, not with authorship, as seen in Sherman’s 
photographs, but rather with a history of her actions.  
 Antoni’s 1992 New York solo debut featured a three-part performance-based art 
object entitled Chocolate Gnaw (Fig. 3), Lard Gnaw (Fig. 4), and Lipslick/ 
Phenylethylamine Display (Fig. 5). These are interrelated works that may be viewed 
individually or collectively. Both medium and action are quintessential to the work. 
Chocolate Gnaw began as a 600lb cube of chocolate in which the artist “eroded” through 
the compulsively repetitive action of biting and spitting out the portion acquired from the 
bite. With Lard Gnaw, Antoni began with a 600lb cube of lard and repeated the same 
laborious process of biting and spitting. Both works were presented raised above the floor 
of the gallery on slightly elevated, makeshift pedestals. The third part of the work, 
Lipslick/ Phenylethylamine Display, represents the “product” of Antoni’s efforts. The 
remnants of Antoni’s actions, the “regurgitated” lard and chocolate, were fashioned into 
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Marina Abramovic,” Art Journal 56 (Winter 1997), 28.   
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commercial goods associated with femininity and “professionally” placed within a 
commercial display case. The “regurgitated” chocolate was used to create chocolate 
hearts, and the lard was used to create lipsticks, which the artist’s named “lipslicks”.  
All three parts are interconnected, with Antoni inserted into the role of primary 
signifier. The aesthetic structure of both Chocolate and Lard Gnaw is minimalist. The 
600lb cubes recall works such as Die, 1962, by Tony Smith (Fig. 6), not simply by the 
cubic shape but also by its sheer massiveness. Both Lard Gnaw and Chocolate Gnaw 
may mimic the geometric reductive features of minimalist art, but the form is eroded by 
Antoni’s physical involvement. She gnaws, bites and regurgitates the lard and chocolate 
to form the third part of the installation, the Lipslick Phenylethylamine Display, which 
contains 300 “lipslicks” made from the lard, and 34 heart shaped packages made from the 
chocolate. The historical allusion to minimalist art and its fundamental form was clearly 
used for phenomenological effect; however, the transcendental universal experience is 
nullified. According to Simon Taylor, “Antoni uses the artificiality of the cube to redirect 
attention to the body and its inchoate biological imperatives.”43     
 By placing an emphasis on the phenomenological aspects of a work of art like 
Gnaw, Antoni is able to redirect attention of the viewer to the body of the maker. 
However, most conspicuously, the body of the maker, Antoni’s body, is absent from the 
work. Dan Cameron makes note of this absence, when he states the following: “What is 
missing from the frame, but apparent from the relationship between the work’s four 
components, is the role of the artist as a key performative element that has been 
conspiciously added and then removed. Of course this is true in any example of the  
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plastic arts, but explicit references to Antoni's own physical interaction with the materials 
in Gnaw produces a structural tension that seems almost narrative in its complicity with 
the viewer’s inherent tendency toward closure.”44 Cameron seems almost unaware in this 
statement that this closure that he describes as a “tendency toward closure” is in effect a 
socially reinforced compulsive need for authorship. If such authorship could be applied to 
Antoni, as with Levine and Sherman, it would discredit Antoni and her “message” 
through “otherness,” making her “radical” and therefore, dismissive. If one dismisses the 
work of Antoni as the “other,” then the body politic is protected and the myths that draw 
their content from the body politic are thus reinforced.  
This absence is fundamental to Gnaw. Initially, one may experience a feeling of 
invasion, as though vermin have nibbled feverishly upon a food substance left out in 
one’s kitchen. The marks made by Antoni’s teeth and mouth are initially left relatively 
unnoticed by the viewer, and then when discovered, seem to be invasive. The materiality 
of the substances, however, dislocates this feeling. Her activities seem then to represent 
overindulgence, an activity that is familiar to the viewers of Antoni’s work. (Afterall, 
how many of us have not at one time or another absent mindedly eaten an entire bag of 
potato chips or cookies.) The viewer can easily visualize the actions of Antoni 
conceptually, placing his or herself into the role of the artist. Thus, the making of Gnaw 
becomes a plural event conceptually. This plurality of the conceptual engagement of the 
activity, not only decreases Authorship, but it also opens the Text. Unlike a traditional 
performance which is inherently a part of time, the absence of the artist’s body serves as 
a “place” to reengage the work, perpetuating it in time without diminishing the artist’s 
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actions. This conceptualism on the part of the viewer/participant increases the physical 
involvement with the work, increasing the phenomenological experience.  
With Antoni’s absence, the “completion” of the work can only be arrived at 
through the conceptual participation of the viewer/participant.  The movement of the 
viewer/participant from one object to the other forces a sort of completion upon the 
viewer/participant, in which Antoni’s absence serves as an important part of the work, 
because it is the point of entry for the viewer to become the participant. The temporal 
aspect of participation through both physical movement and conceptual reenactment 
emphasizes the phenomenological qualities of Gnaw. Edmond Husserl refers to this 
activity, when he describes the temporal succession of phases, which create a conceptual 
form. He writes that “[t]he temporal succession itself as a form of being of the temporal 
object; the being of the temporal object is a being in succession of “object-points,” which 
form a continuum by virtue of this continual form of being.”45  This continuum permits 
Gnaw to “exist” outside of the boundaries of time, endowing it with a sort of invisible 
form, which engages the viewer, forcing a conceptual participation that continues the 
activity of gnawing the lard and chocolate.  
Cameron also makes note of this conceptual continuation of the activity, when he 
states that “[i]n effect, there are two Gnaws under consideration: one that is visible, and 
one in which the now-absent figure of the artist performed- and, in our imagination, 
continues to perform- the activities that resulted in the objects that we are now 
contemplating.”46 Cameron seems, however, to be attempting to close the “text” of the 
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activity and impose an imaginary authorship upon Antoni. Otherwise, why else would he 
insist the viewer imagine the artist continuing to perform the already performed actions? 
This reinforces an expectation of “otherness” in regard to the work, a conceptual distance 
rather than a conceptual engagement. Furthermore, it forces a singularity upon the artist 
as maker, which is ironic considering that he admits that the viewer must conceptualize, 
or “imagine,” this activity. Cameron presupposes an open interaction with the work and 
then closes it with authorship. In doing so he neglects the historicism that Antoni 
implanted in the work by choosing the minimalist cube as the “visible form” of the work. 
This allusion was not anecdotical, but functional. A “linguistic” device utilized to redirect 
attention to the viewer and his or her physical body, rather than upon the artist, to do so 
would submit to the modernist notion of the artist as unique and singular, a “genius,” 
which can be reduced to authorship.   
Antoni’s absence in the work also emphasizes the banality of the activity of 
eating, chewing and gnawing. These are activities that we all participate in on a daily 
basis for survival, and those that are ongoing typically without and conscious 
involvement. Amparo Lozano also makes note of this importance of absence, stating, 
“Janine Antoni conceives her work as an ongoing process, like those of everyday 
activities which make up our existence. In this way she converts those different everyday 
experiences –chewing, eating, washing, sleeping- into sculptural process.”47  Perhaps, the 
question that becomes most pervasive is what is the importance of emphasizing these 
activities? The answer is quite simplistic. The ideas that shape our lives are not the 
monumental questions of life, but instead they are truly the routines of everyday life that 
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shape our identities. However, routines are only seemingly routine, particularly those that 
engage the public. These routines are not without regulation. On the contrary, they are 
extremely regulated and ordered. Even private activities have the potential for 
embarrassment and reprimand. How one eats, chews even swallows food is scrutinized. 
Even the selection of what one eats seems to inform others about our character.  Thus, 
these activities are very much issues of morality. These banal everyday, almost 
dismissive activities create a semiological construct of identity. The value judgements 
that we experience are a result of the Body Politic that is perpetuated by myth. Susan 
Bordo explains this quite simply, when she states that “[t]he body---what we eat, how we 
dress, the daily rituals through which attend to the body---is a medium of culture.”48 The 
question then evolves to whose culture? To the disenfranchised, such as women, the 
imposition of culture is often a tool of oppression.  
Many scholars have scrutinized the body’s role as a social construct. Perhaps, the 
most renowned is Michel Foucault who explored the body’s role for societal control in 
his “genealogical” works such as Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality. In 
his text Discipline and Punish, Foucault describes what he calls the “docile body,” one in 
which one’s conscious political, social and personal beliefs are usurped by one’s body.49 
The everyday activities speak one’s beliefs and ideologies, let alone social position 
within a culture. Bordo explains the significance of the “docile body’ as it relates to 
feminism, when she states, “female bodies have become docile bodies---bodies whose 
forces and energies are habituated to external regulation, subjection, transformation, 
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 30
“improvement.”50  Antoni’s absent action of gnawing, not only creates a 
phenomenological form, but also places emphasis on the role of such routine behaviors as 
eating, and how it is regulated by society in a way in which social control is hardly felt, 
but cumulative in its repercussions. 
Through her actions, Antoni places herself (her body) into the position of the 
language-object, which ‘speaks things.’51 Myth is composed of metalanguage, which 
speaks of things. This is how myth is entrapping. When one comments on the structure of 
culture, one takes the position of the “other” and speaks about or of the myth itself. 
Antoni speaks the myth by placing herself (body) into the position of the language-object. 
Barthes explains this distinction quite clearly, when he describes the woodcutter scenario. 
The woodcutter, as Barthes relates in his Mythologies, is defined through his actions, not 
through discourse or reflection of those actions. To do so would be to mythologize the 
activity, and in the moment of those actions a language-object exists. The woodcutter 
‘speaks the tree.’52 He does not speak ‘about’ or ‘of’ the tree. His relationship to the tree 
is operation.  According to Barthes, “[t]his means that my language is operational, 
transitively linked to its object; between the tree and myself, there is nothing but my 
labour, that is to say, an action. This is a political language: it represents nature for me 
only inasmuch as I am going to transform it, it is language thanks to which I ‘act the 
object’; the tree is not an image for me, it is simply the meaning of action.”53  
Antoni literally ‘acts the object’, when she gnaws and regurgitates the chocolate 
and lard cubes. Her actions can then be viewed as linguistic. Furthermore, the viewer’s 
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conceptual continuation of her action allows him or her to ‘act the object’ and not merely 
speak of or about the action, which pictorialism would encourage. The viewer ‘speaks’ 
the chocolate and the lard through this conceptual reenactment and continuation of the 
action. This removes any possibility of Authorship through the plurality of the 
viewer/participant. The Body Politic also loses its authority with Antoni’s absence, due to 
the inability to place Authorship, in which she would be reduced to her sex, which would 
perpetuate myths of femininity by animalizing the speaker (Antoni).    
 Unlike Marina Abramovic who was literally reduced to her sex and animalized by 
her viewer/ participants in her Rhythm O, Janine Antoni avoids this partly through her 
absence and by ‘speaking’ the activity of eating, but she is also successful due to the 
chosen materials. The substances that Antoni chose to gnaw and regurgitate in Lard 
Gnaw and Chocolate Gnaw encourage and engage the viewer to become the conceptual 
participant. If the substances had been unknown or offensive, then it would have been 
difficult to imagine the phenomenological form that resulted from her absence and the 
viewer/participation that occurred. Chocolate and lard, however, are familiar substances, 
which seem to appeal to the viewer due to their taboo qualities in a health conscious 
society. It is ironic that the first impulse is not to animalize Antoni, but to emulate her. 
Her action of gnawing at the two substances is an animalistic action. There is no pretence 
of table etiquette, but quite the contrary, an animalistic desire to engage the materials. An 
animalism that seems to appeal to the viewer, and his or her hidden, suppressed desires, 
and it is this identification of suppression of the personal, the animalistic, that exposes, in 
reflection, the body politic and the myths that control society, subjugating the 
disenfranchised.  
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 The focus on medium also makes reference to the post-minimalist process artists, 
such as Richard Serra (b. 1939), Hans Haacke (b. 1936), Joseph Beuys (1921-1986), and 
perhaps most importantly, Eva Hesse (1936-1970). Roberta Smith succinctly describes 
the movement being anti-form, or resistant to notions of permanence. According to 
Smith, many of these artists “held on to materials but jettisoned the object, divesting their 
work of structure, permanence and boundaries via random, temporary distributions, 
‘scatter pieces’ both indoors and out, of no-rigid ephemeral substances- sawdust, cut-up 
bits of felt, loose pigment, flour, latex, snow, even cornflakes.”54 Hans Haacke and Eva 
Hesse both often retained the Minimalist geometry, while placing emphasis on the 
medium to signify meaning. Antoni is no different. However, unlike the process artists 
whose innovative use of medium signified originality, Antoni’s use of medium serves the 
task of signifying meaning, not only by means of its materiality, but also through the 
performative and mechanized processes that deconstruct it (Lard Gnaw and Chocolate 
Gnaw) and reconstruct it (Lipslick/ Polythylamine Display). 
 This reconstruction of the medium into the “Liplislicks” is repetitive of Antoni’s 
physical approach to her art making, and provides a dualistic mythological process. The 
making of Lard Gnaw and Chocolate Gnaw both take on historical precedents, and the 
“gnawing” too inserts Antoni into the physical history of the objects. The latter Lipslick/ 
Polythylamine Display  becomes externalized, through its mechanical reproduction, as a 
deformation of Antoni’s internal deformation of “myth.” Through her own appropriation 
of art historical signifiers Antoni deforms their independent meanings, which were full of 
signification independently and empties them through her action of gnawing and 
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“regurgitating” and the juxtaposition of art historical concepts, such as the universalism 
of modernism and the modernist attachment to the author for authenticity. The physical 
transmutation of the oral remnants thus exacts a similar outcome to the signification of 
the gnawed remains. Through an external process of myth making, the signification of 
the gnawed remains is deformed to form another “myth,” emptying the full signifier to 
make an empty one.   
 Barthes wrote that “[j]ust as with Freud the manifest meaning of behavior is 
distorted by its latent meaning, in myth the meaning is distorted by its content.”55 Within 
the context of art making, Antoni shifts behavior (her gnawing and “regurgitating” of the 
chocolate cube and the lard cube) into a signifier, converting Freudian associations into 
signifiers within a newly developed sign for eating disorders. The performative actions 
on the chocolate and lard can easily be viewed as Freudian in terms of oral fixation. 
However, the juxtaposition of the art historical and the physical (Antoni’s actions), 
negate psychoanalysis and force it to the surface in the role of signifier.  
Most interesting is that a removal of gender occurs through the Freudian signifier. 
In describing the oral stage of infantile sexuality, Freud explains the following: “In this 
early period a loose sort of organization exists which we shall call pre-genital [.] The 
contrast between masculine and feminine plays no part as yet; instead of it there is a 
contrast between active and passive, which may be described as a forerunner of the 
sexual polarity with which it also links up later.”56 This pre-genital, degenderized aspect 
is an important feature in Antoni’s approach. It fulfills the first part of a duplicitous 
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mythological system in all three components of Lard Gnaw, Chocolate Gnaw and 
Lipslick/ Polythylamine Display.  
Both Lard Gnaw and Chocolate Gnaw signify, with the facial and dental 
impressions (respectfully), a primal, innate desire that is compulsive, which feeds into the 
sign of Freudian infantile sexuality. The media, however, do not seem to have genderless 
signification. Therefore, the medium and the facial and dental impressions function as 
collaborative signifiers. Linda Weintraub confirms this by reflecting differentiating 
gender responses, when she states the following: “Men are aroused by the erotic 
implications of obsessive nibbling and licking. Women, on the other hand, respond with 
repulsion.”57 This repulsion, Weintraub continues, is linked to representations in 
multimedia of the need to “slim down” for women, and this reaction is similar in younger 
and older women. Large amounts of either substance if consumed, would cause a 
negative physical response for either gender. However, notions of consumption clearly 
provide differing social significations for each gender, which are culturally specific and 
connected to the performative act and the respective substance.  
However, in a wider sense Antoni states, “[m]aybe we’re in a bulimic society~ we 
are addicted to that fast fix and then throw it away. Maybe that’s what packaging is; it’s 
all for immediate satisfaction, then it is discarded.”58 The physical signifiers of gnawing 
and the substances gnawed feed into the final part with their inclusion, literally, in 
Lipslick/ Polythylamine Display, which becomes a mythical signifier in this commentary 
on “bulimic society.” The gobs of lard and chunks of chocolate, now embodied with a 
history of Antoni’s gnawing and “regurgitation,” are distorted in their new found 
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representations of lipstick and chocolate heart containers, forming a new myth reflective 
of a capitalistic need to socialize women. The genderless, minimal cubes become imbued 
with new significance in the context and presence of the Lipslick/ Phenylethylamine 
Display, with its commercial features and stereotypical female contents, thus prompting a 
questioning of gender identity and the effects of culture to determine it. Unlike Levine’s 
or Sherman’s, Antoni’s specific gender is never revealed in the artwork. Rather, her 
physical presence is simply referenced through the facial and dental impressions in the 
two feet cubed blocks of lard and chocolate. Antoni, however, is a pluralistic artist. She 
does not restrict her modality of making. She does not only rely upon minimalist forms to 
produce a phenomenology in the viewer/ participant, in order to create plurality. In the 
next chapter, a work made between 1993-1994, Lick and Lather (Fig. 7 and Fig. 8) will 
be discussed. This is a work in which Antoni’s representational “portrait” is physically 
engaged through licking and lathering by the artist, again producing a phenomenological 











Chapter Eight: Janine Antoni’s Lick and Lather 
In another artwork made between 1993-1994, Antoni shifts from simply 
referencing her physical presence to depicting herself in a representational mode. With 
Lick and Lather (Fig. 6 and Fig. 7), a series of duplicitous busts were made by casting the 
artists face. Media, as in Gnaw, were instrumental in establishing the dichotomy. One set 
was made of chocolate and the other of soap. However, unlike Gnaw, where the remains 
of the chocolate and lard were refashioned into a cultural and commercial identity in the 
form of “lipslicks” and heart-shaped chocolate packages, identity was worn away in a 
performative process leaving the busts in a state of varying states of androgyny. For the 
chocolate busts, the artist “passionately licks the image of her corpse, recreating herself 
in multiple variations.”59 The soap busts were eroded with Antoni in the bathtub, where 
handling caused them “to resemble the faces of ancient monuments that have endured 
centuries of fondling and harsh weather.”60  
Again, menial, everyday tasks are performed by an unseen Antoni evoking the 
body politic and the “docile body” of everydayness. Indulgence, an unclean act, is 
countered by bathing. The binary opposition of structuralism is alluded to through the 
media and the artist. Antoni’s actions were imbued with a multitude of cultural meanings 
that questioned conventional myths of femininity. The artist continues to ‘speak’ the 
object, making her actions operational. It is from this position that the artist is able to 
politicize her speech and form the counter-myth through the history of her actions. 
However this creation of the phenomenological through the conceptual continuation of  
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the activity, as discussed with Gnaw, by the viewer is nullified, due, in part, to Antoni’s 
changing visage represented through the cast media. It is also diminished through the 
intimacy of Antoni’s actions. The presence of the chewed remains in Chocolate and Lard 
Gnaw did not determine the location of activity. Eating is as much a social activity as it is 
a private one. However, Lick and Lather invokes a privatization of action, unseen actions 
that are meant to remain unseen, such as sex and bathing.   
The medium of chocolate links Gnaw to Lick and Lather, however, its 
signification seems to shift from one to the other due to Antoni’s aesthetic strategies. In 
Gnaw, the phenomenological effect is emphasized by the minimalist cube that directed 
the attention away from the object and toward the viewer. This, however, is not the 
situation with Lick and Lather. The “otherness” that was avoided through the plurality of 
conceptual participation is embraced in this work, forcing a dialogue of “otherness” in 
society and within us, the viewers. Lick and Lather is metaphysical in its approach to 
feminine identity. Authorship is dismissed due to the “otherness” of self that Antoni 
represents through the multiple, eroded cast ‘selves’ that differentiate from one another 
depending upon the time and activities spent with each. Antoni represents a fragmented 
self, and this fragmentation resists authorship, because it refuses closure. 
Metaphysical philosophies are divided, when it comes to the question of identity. 
The key question is does identity remain constant over time? Or does identity change 
over time to the extent that separate selves are created? For example, is a person the same 
person, he or she was a year, month or even a day previously? Externally, it seems absurd 
to think that a person’s identity changes. A person uses the same name over time, has 
shared memories over time, and certain elements of classification do not seem to change. 
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One’s gender, race and place of origin do not change with time. However, internally, as 
one recollects certain stages of his or her life, it seems strange to think that one is the 
same person as he or she was when, for example, one was in the third grade or after a 
defining experience such as war or giving birth. The problem of identity over time is, 
perhaps, irreconcilable. For myth, however, the idea of a fixed or continuous identity 
allows myth to seem ‘natural.’ Antoni’s physical interaction with the busts changes their 
visage and also challenges the notion of continuous identity. All begin as identical 
visages and are changed by her physical interaction.  
In a recent interview, Antoni commented on this question of identity and its 
relationship to change and time, when she stated that she was thinking about the “erasure 
of this specific personality,”61 when creating Lick and Lather. For Antoni the relationship 
of identity and representation is one of conflict. To represent something is an attempt to 
fix it in time, be it a long period of time or a short period of time. For Antoni the self-
portrait is one presented to the world, it is a public image of oneself. She goes on to 
ponder, “I guess my question was- is that an accurate description of the self? And are we 
more ourselves alone at home eating a meal or in the bathtub, in these everyday 
activities.”62 The idea of the changing self according to context challenges the semiology 
of myth. Myth employs tautology for justification. In terms of identity for example it may 
simply say, “You are who you are.” This tautology provides a sense of proverbial truth, a 
stability, necessary for myth to function, but it is here that myth reveals itself. By 
defining like by like, myth performs “a magical act ashamed of itself, which verbally 
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makes the gesture of rationality, but immediately abandons the latter, and believes itself 
to be even with causality because it has uttered the word which introduces it.”63  
In order to understand how myth is tautological in structure, one must remember 
that myth today is discontinuous and based upon a phraseology, rather than, an epic 
narrative, this phraseology is composed of stereotypes, which can form the identity of the 
Other. The epic narrative attempted to explain the world and humanity as a product of 
this world created by a higher power. Phraseology, a corpus of stereotypes and 
generalizations by contrast, is by contrast a pseudoscience, in which observation, a key 
component of the scientific method, is manipulated by myth, in order to establish an 
“understanding” of diversity within a society. Unlike the epic myth, phraseology is 
adaptive to progress and change, removing the historicism of epic myth and replacing it 
with a sense of the modern, the now. Thus, the mythical is made by affixing, not a 
narrative, but a “taxonomy” of thought and associating “perceptions” to those who 
attempt to disrupt it. In terms of modern America, all one must do to gain an 
understanding of the mythical is think of the number of associations built upon the word 
“Hippie,” and more importantly how those associations have shifted during later decades 
in order to conform to the body politic. Barthes provides insight by stating the following: 
“Contemporary myth is discontinuous. It is no longer expressed in long fixed narratives 
but only in ‘discourse’; at most, it is a phraseology, a corpus of phrases (of stereotypes); 
myth disappears, but leaving – so much the more insidious – the mythical.”64  
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The mythical demands simplicity. The very question of the nature of identity 
threatens myth, because it threatens the stereotypes that reinforce mythical speech. On the 
preservation of myth, Barthes commented that “[i]t is frozen in to something natural; it is 
not read as motive, but as a reason.”65 If motives were revealed, then so too the body 
politic would be revealed. By addressing the question of identity through the repetition of 
her represented self and its changing visage through her interactions with them, Antoni 
destabilizes the idea of fixed identity, which stereotypes are dependent upon, in order to 
“naturalize” myth. This destabilization reveals the false nature of the myth of fixed 
identity. The idea of a fixed identity is a necessary one in order to impose authorship 
upon the artist and close the Text. 
Antoni’s use of repetition of the cast self demonstrates the elasticity of identity 
and art’s inability to encapsulate the self pictorially. Identity can not be fixed, be it 
continuous or not. However, myth requires this not to be the truth or else its motives will 
be revealed, and the body politic, which relies upon the “docile body” for control, will be 
exposed as the maker of the myth. The idea of representing the self is in fact a means of 
closing the Text. Antoni’s idea of ‘erasure’ is a strategy of removing false representation 
(myth) in order to obtain figuration. In regard to the licking and bathing of Lick and 
Lather, Antoni stated the following: “It’s modeling in the sense that when you carve, you 
start with a block and you remove from it. But what I am doing is starting from a 
representation of myself and then removing from it.”66   
In this removal, figuration occurs through the unseen self of Antoni’s actions.  
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Ewa Lajer-Burcharth discusses how Antoni ‘speaks’ the stereotype through her actions 
upon the soap and chocolate, when she states, “Antoni enacts stereotypes of femininity, 
yet rather than taking an ironic distance from them, she inhabits and undoes them from 
within, thus exposing the extent to which a woman is both embarrassingly caught and 
capable of reformulating her entrapment.”67 As Antoni licked the chocolate busts and 
bathed with the soap ones, her actions endowed the objects with an eroticism invoked by 
her activities. This eroticism of the unseen body and actions of Antoni produces a 
figuration that usurps the myth of representation. Barthes distinguishes between 
figuration and representation, by explaining that “[f]iguration is the way that the erotic 
body appears (to whatever degree and in what ever form that may be) in the profile of the 
text. Representation on the other hand is embarrassed figuration, encumbered with other 
meanings than that of desire: a space of alibis (reality, morality, likelihood, readability, 
truth, etc.).”68 Thus, Antoni’s work produces figuration, whereas, the cast multiples 
signify representation, an embarrassed figuration, embarrassed due to the associations of 
the body politic and its agent myth. This semiologically endows the cast visages of 
Antoni with a false reality of complacency associated with the “docile body.” 
Representation always produces this false metaphysical “truth,” which denies desire. 
Figuration on the other hand is a production of desire. 
Lajer-Burcharth comments on this condition of figuration that Antoni’s actions 
produce, when she states the following: “Licking and lathering, the artist modifies not 
only the physical body but also the symbolic capacity of the portrait bust as a genre that  
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secures an intelligible and meaningful image of the self. The different, unflattering 
altered versions of Antoni’s face undermine the idealizing effects of self-portraiture and, 
even more, its very powers of resemblance, its claim to physiognomic truth, and through 
it, to any other kinds of truths and historically gendered values[.]”69 In other words, 
Antoni’s actions upon Lick and Lather negate the semiological construct associated with 
the representational depictions of her multiple, cast “selves,” which through their 
plurality refuse individuation and thus any notion of authorship.  
Antoni, the unseen figure, invokes a figuration to occur. One in which the erotic 
body can appear through her absence, without ‘embarrassment,’ and in the presence of 
the representation- the agent of the body politic, the producer of myth- which is 
demonstrated through the mythologically saturated depiction of Antoni’s chocolate and 
soap busts. This concurs, in part, with the artist, Mary Kelly (b. 1941), who stated that 
“[l]earning to speak depends upon the ability to conceptualize absence and establish 
differences.”70 Antoni does both. Through the juxtaposition of representation and 
figuration, which is produced through her actions upon the cast portraits, she speaks the 
difference and thus undermines myths of femininity associated with female depiction, 
replacing them with the history of her activities.  
Antoni produces figuration via an intimate “touch.” Licking, lathering, tasting, 
bathing are not experiences that can be represented as they are. Instead, any attempt to 
represent such experiences is easily dismissed as lacking truth, for such things are 
ineffable. The artifice of the cast “selves” is revealed by her unseen actions upon them,  
                                                          
69 Ewa Lajer-Burcharth, Antoni’s Difference,” in Janine Antoni (New York, NY: Ink Tree Press, 
2000), 56. 
70 Mary Kelly, Imaging Desire (Cambridge: The MIT Press 1996), 3. 
 43
which embody Antoni’s figure through absence. The body is the sight of the 
phenomenological and these changing visages merely become objects acted upon. The 
visual effects of touch remind the viewer of the living, feeling body that is removed, and 
that as Husserl explains “the body is, in the first place, the medium of all perception; it is 
the organ of perception [.]”71 Lick and Lather encourages the viewer to conceptualize the 
intimate experience of the body, now absent. This unseen body which produces figuration 
through “touch” exemplifies notions of Luce Irigaray, when she states the following: 
“[T]he predominance of the visual, and of the discrimination and individualization of 
form, is particularly foreign to female eroticism. Woman takes pleasure more from 
touching than from looking, and her entry into a dominant scopic economy signifies, 
again, her consignment to passivity: she is to be the beautiful object of contemplation.”72 
The cast representations, the objects of contemplation, which were intended to define 
Antoni are instead informed not by the body politic, but by the “touch” of Antoni, and in 
doing so, Antoni refuses the “docile body” of this dominant scopic economy.  
 This rejection of the “docile body” is also seen through signification. Originally 
set up facing one another with the chocolate busts opposing the soap ones, the mythical 
construct that Antoni had made with Gnaw is inverted and lacks a resolving signifier, like 
the Lipslick/ Phenylethylamine Display. Nevertheless, Antoni is still engaged in a type of 
mythical speech. The culminating signifier is Antoni herself and the actions of licking 
and bathing, which signify, akin to Gnaw, a Freudian signification. A reduction to the  
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genderless oral stage of infantile psychosexual development is not the objective of the 
myth here; rather an unresolved duplicitous signification of desire and denial is signified. 
Referring to Gnaw, Jeffrey Deitch points out that the chocolate and lard also serve as 
signifiers that “provoke the comparison of dark and light, dirty and clean, desire and 
denial.”73 These signifiers are given a primary position with Lick and Lather, and it is 
important to note that “a signified can have several signifiers.”74  
As the viewer walks between, the two sets of busts, he or she is placed between 
these opposing signifiers, and becomes a signifier of conflict between them. Thus, as with 
Gnaw, the viewer is thrust into an empathetic, phenomenological position that makes use 
of historicism of minimalism to form the myth. “Ancient or not, mythology can only have 
a historical foundation, for myth is a type of speech chosen by history; it cannot possibly 
evolve from the ‘nature’ of things.”75  The Western tradition of the portrait bust is also a 
signifier for Antoni’s myth in Lick and Lather. Repetition, a minimalist strategy, is 
appropriated by Antoni here and, to a lesser degree, with Gnaw. However, this usage 
reaffirms the historical president of the portrait bust in Western culture.  
Within the deconstructive preamble of “art being born of imitation,”76 Antoni 
embraces the use of the outline to reinforce mythical content. The variously eroded 
visages of her self give way to the contours of the classical portrait bust, repeated seven 
times in each medium. “The outline (design or melodic line) is not only what permits 
imitation and recognition of the represented in the represented. It is the element of formal 
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difference which permits the contents (colored or sonorous substance) to appear.”77 
Barthes mythical system does not conflict with Derrida, in terms of repetition. Barthes 
reiterates that “[t]his repetition of the concept through different forms is precious to the 
mythologist, it allows him to decipher the myth; it is the insistence of a kind of behavior 
which reveals its intentions.”78 Therefore, Antoni’s two-fold duplicity provides this kind 
of repetition of the outline. The face, through casting, is a repetition of her own, and the 
form of the portrait bust is a repetition of Western history, both through the use of outline 
for recognition. With Lick and Lather, both a literal outline and a conceptual outline were 
“eroded” by Antoni. In the following chapter, Loving Care (Fig. 9 and Fig. 10) performed 
and “made” by Antoni in 1993 will be examined. This work demonstrates that the 
deconstructive act of “eroding” outline can be made a constructive act of creating a 
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Chapter Nine: Janine Antoni’s Loving Care 
In contrast to the “erosion” of the outline in Lick and Lather though the 
performative aspect of licking and bathing the busts, a 1993 performance titled Loving 
Care (Fig. 9) creates an outline through the performance. Thus, the performance 
functions again as an insertion into the mythology that Antoni simultaneously assembles 
and deconstructs. Deitch succinctly states that “[i]n Loving Care, one of her major works 
subsequent to Gnaw, she drenches her hair with black dye and mops the floor with it, and 
in this devotional ritual takes on the history of recent painting.”79 In both Gnaw and Lick 
and Lather, the physical body’s action was referenced through its effects and subsequent 
history, which is infused with the performance-based object. In Loving Care the artist’s 
actions are not private, but made public to an audience of gallery-goers, seemingly 
shifting its significance. Nevertheless, the mythology functions in a similar system. The 
connection to the body in all three major works discussed has been the crucial signifier 
for revealing significance and mythical structure. Loving Care is no different. By shifting 
attention to the Anthony D’Offay Gallery floor, the seemingly pure performance is 
instantly removed and placed in similar terms of the performance object, making Antoni 
once again a historical signifier of the work.  
The medium and its outline(s) (historical references) of Loving Care become 
quite similar to Gnaw and Lick and Lather. The hair dye signifies both the use of paint 
and the commercially infused desire to change one’s appearance. Therefore, an analogy 
to the “lipslicks” of Gnaw can be made. The use of her own “living” hair as the “brush” 
during the “mopping” of the floor signifies a general critique of the history of painting,  
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where the majority of paintings of women were made by men. This also seems to allude 
to the painting method of Jackson Pollock (1912-1956), where removing the canvas from 
the easel and painting on the canvas, on the floor, and without a support signified male 
genius. It is an ironic gesture, which paradoxically removes Antoni’s identity, while 
making her presence essential. RoseLee Goldberg states that “for her it was an ironic 
provocation of male-dominated legacies (in this case of Pollock and Klein), a frequent 
theme in her work.”80 The use of a bucket, the floor and the act of mopping also serves as 
a signifier of the menial repetitive tasks traditionally reserved as women’s work. The end 
result contradicts the Modernist notion of originality, just as Congo, the chimpanzee, did 
with his abstract painting in the 1970s.81 The floor being temporal and the need for 
documentation remind one of process art of the late 1960s and 1970s.       
The problem of authorship, which is seen in Cindy Sherman’s photographs, 
appears in Loving Care. The work is primarily known, not present for its making or 
fortunate enough to witness the floor of the Anthony D’Offay Gallery, but as a 
photograph of the performative signifier. The problem that this causes is iconographic. 
Unlike Gnaw and Lick and Lather, which are known through their performative conduits, 
Loving Care is known in process. Only one photograph that I have been able to discover 
shows it in any other way. In Janine Antoni’s monograph, Loving Care (Fig. 9 and Fig. 
10) is shown without Antoni. The “presence” of Antoni’s absence is profound. As with 
Gnaw and Lick and Lather, a Husserlian form is created. The viewer is compelled to 
phenomenologically “enter” the work. Antoni’s actions are not unique or privileged. 
                                                          
80 RoseLee Goldberg, 137. 
81 During the 1970s Congo, a chimpanzee, produced a number of gestural abstract paintings after 
being taught by his caretakers. Congo’s paintings have an elegance and proficiency that challenge notions 
of “genius” associated with abstract expressionist painters. 
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They are not the product of “genius,” but are produced by a banal (and seemingly absurd) 
activity of using one’s hair as a brush. Intially the gallery-goers functioned as on-lookers, 
and Antoni disrupted the visual activity of watching her in two ways. First as she 
“mopped” the floor, the viewers became physical participants by moving away from the 
messy activity. Second, the odor of the hair-dye must have been overwhelming to the 
senses. After Antoni’s activity ceased the space was “barred” from physical entry. The 
work produced was not iconic, but the product of a narrative, Antoni’s actions. In order to 
“enter” the work, the viewer had to visualize her activities. However, these were not only 
her activities, but those of the viewer. He or she had been a participant, moving in time 
and experiencing the odors produced by the chemicals of “beauty.” Antoni’s method, 
being democratic, encourages the viewer to make the “leap” and “engage” Antoni’s 
activities from a first person point of viewer, cognitively “becoming” the Author, and 
thus negating traditional notions of singularity associated with authorship and “genius.”  
  Antoni’s intentions differ from those of Sherman, who attempts to reclaim the 
female body through her plurality of representations of her individual self. She is unlike 
Sherman whose authorship is based on the appropriated stereotypical female stereotype. 
Antoni attempts to avoid authorship in Loving Care through both her posturing and 
actions. Being on all fours in a regressive act, Antoni’s physical presence becomes 
desexualized through its Freudian signification. She re-enters the pre-genital state, as also 
signified with Gnaw. Because she is wearing a black top and pants her physical sexuality 
is meant to be avoided as a primary signifier. She is not the nude female performance 
artist attempting to reclaim the female body. This differentiates her from feminist 
performance artists of the 1960s and 1970s, like Shigeko Kubota (b.1937), whose 
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performance, Vagina Painting (Fig. 11), 1965, may have been similar in theme and 
intent, but made direct use of the female anatomy. Kubota, like Abramovic, is reduced to 
her “sex.”82 This gender reduction empowers myth by imposing authorship, which closes 
the Text.   
One must now question why that the most proliferated image of the performance 
is not the one of the “painted” floor of the D’Offay gallery, but an image of process, 
which conveniently depicts the artist “frozen” on all fours with her rear end facing the 
camera. Antoni’s figuration is removed with this photograph’s presentation. Her 
depiction is a representation, embarrassed and culturally facilitated - a means to discredit 
her activity and reduce her to her “sex,” which is a means of applying an authorship and 
closing the Text. Antoni’s erotic body is removed. This is the problem of documentation. 
The photograph, which appears truthful, is merely a response to the appetites of myth. 
The counter-myth is difficult to produce due to the inductive qualities of myth, which 
Barthes comments upon, when he states that “it thus appears that it is extremely difficult 
to vanquish myth [.] [M]yth can always, as a last resort, signify the resistance which is 
brought to bear against it.”83  
With Loving Care this is accomplished with “documentation,” which through the 
photograph’s composition and insertion of Antoni semiologically subjugates the artist 
through her depiction, which forces her to become, as Irigaray states, “the beautiful 
object of contemplation.”84  Antoni’s content is evaporated by myth, which reclaims her  
                                                          
82 Moira Gatens, “Corporal Representations in/and the Body Politic,” in Writing on the Body: 
Female Embodiment and Feminist Theory, edited by Katie Conboy, et. al. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997), 84. 
83 Barthes, Mythologies, 135. 
84 Luce Irigaray, “The Sex Which Is Not One,” in Writing on the Body: Female Embodiment and 
Feminist Theory, editied by Katie Conboy, et. al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 250. 
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representation in order to distort her content. The image of Antoni, a supposedly detached 
“documentation,” supercedes her intentions. She is silenced. She no longer ‘speaks’ the 
myth, but she is spoken ‘of’ or ‘about.’ Her reduction is ‘fatal’ to her ‘speech,’ becoming 
the “docile body” of Foucault, or as Laura Mulvey would state, “the bearer of meaning, 
not the maker of meaning.”85 The phenomenology of her action is almost completely lost, 
and instead myth distorts and evaporates Antoni’s ‘speech’ and counter-myth. 
Perhaps, this occurs, in part due to Antoni actions. With Gnaw and Lick and 
Lather, the performative elements were unseen, and Antoni’s absence and actions upon 
the materials, the chocolate, lard and soap, facilitated a phenomenological form, which 
shifted the viewer into the position of conceptual participant. Chocolate, lard and soap are 
all ephemeral materials; however, they remain more or less constant unless an action is 
placed upon them. The floor of the gallery is not. It is “tied” to Antoni, and soon after the 
performative action is completed the floor will most likely be cleaned. If the floor of the 
D’Offay Gallery had been removed, as Richard Serra’s “throwing lead” work, 1969, had 
been for Leo Castelli’s gallery, the signification of the work would be similar to that of 
Gnaw and Lick and Lather, that is the emphasis would be placed upon the ‘acted upon’ 
object and its materials, not the “documentation” of the performance, which represents 
Antoni for scopic effect.  
Thus, three elements are necessary for Antoni’s mythical speech: absence, object 
and actions. This work only supplies the latter. The object of the floor, which could have 
been physically retained, is not, and the nature of this performance is public, which 
negated the phenomenological form that produces plurality through conceptual 
                                                          
85 Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” Screen , 16:3 (London: Autumn, 
1975), 6-18.  
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participation. Loving Care due to its structure, sacrifices its content for the content of the 
body politic, which ‘speaks’ through the semiological structure of myth. Perhaps, most 
fundamental is Antoni’s absence, which opens the Text allowing the viewer to become 
the conceptual participant. Antonti ‘speaks’ work, through her actions. Her actions, 
however, are democratic, not the product of training or “genius.” This encourages the 
viewer to become a cognitive surrogate for Antoni, replacing her “body” with his or her 
own, creating a phenomenological form and disrupting the authorship by making many 
“Authors.” Each produces a “text” of the work through conceptual participation in its 
making. 
It is ironic then that some feminist critics would find fault with this element of 
‘speech.’ Ideas concerning authorship and subjectivity as Rosemary Betterton explains 
are a point of opposing difference for many feminists in regard to contemporary critical 
theory. She writes the following: “On one side, there are those who believe that women 
have a vested interest in the deconstruction of the powerful authorial figure defined 
within Enlightenment aesthetics, a tradition of mastery within a predominately white, 
male, Euro-centric narrative. On the other, are those who argue that women have too 
recently acceded to artistic identity and subjectivity to let it go.”86 Myth has, however, 
already supplied language with the content of the body politic, and if one uses the ready 
supplied language of culture, myth subjugates the speaker to the position of the author of 
the minority, thus reducing the Text and making the myth seem ‘natural’ by contrast. 
Antoni’s absence, on the other hand, denies the myth the convenience of representation, 
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(New York: Routledge, 1996), 161. 
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which would semiologically close the Text. Antoni’s absence removes the Otherness that 
myth wants to place upon her.  
Thus, it seems strange that critics like Mary Kelly would denounce absence as a 
feminist tactic. She writes that “[t]he (neo) feminist alternative has been to refuse the 
literal figuration of the woman’s body, creating significance out of its absence. But this 
does not signal a new form of iconoclasm. The artist does not protest against the lure of 
the picture. In another way, however, her practice could be said to be blasphemous 
insofar as she seeks to appropriate the gaze from behind it (the place of gods, auteurs, and 
evil eyes).”87 The idea of appropriating the gaze from behind seems quite frankly absurd. 
The mental conception of woman is certainly distorted by myth; however, Antoni places 
the viewer in a context, a physical context, which stimulates the phenomenology of 
experience, creating a form. Her absence de-genders the work in such a way as to 
produce history through her actions – actions that enable the viewer to conceptually 
participate, removing Otherness, which subjugate the image of woman through the 
semiology of myth, as seen with the “documentation,” the photographic representation of 
Antoni, of Loving Care.  
To continue representing the self, as Cindy Sherman does, in order to be 
iconoclastic, is a thwarted effort. Such efforts ‘to speak’ the subject are negated by the 
myths attached to that language. A ‘refusal of speech’ through the unseen performance is 
a positive movement in reconfiguring the significance of the female image by 
demonstrating the inability of ‘speech’ to communicate meaning, making known that the 
semiology and content of the myth is archaic. Furthermore, Antoni’s emphasis on  
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“touch,” which is invoked by her absence, feminizes the work removing it from the male 
dominated scopic economy.88 Antoni’s absence produces figuration, not representation. 
Kelly suggests a re-representation, which, due to the limitations of language, reinforces 
myth and Otherness.   
If one were to encounter Loving Care with Antoni absent, then the artist would 
have been successful in the production of the counter-myth through the usage of the 
language-object, her actions upon the floor. Only through her physical absence is Antoni 
successful in manufacturing counter-myths, which re-evaluate the language of the myths 
produced by the body politic. This evaluation of Loving Care is not meant to discredit 
her, but simply demonstrate the tenacity of myth. Laura Mulvey reflects upon this 
difficulty facing Antoni, when she states that “[i]t cannot be easy to move from 
oppression and its mythologies to resistance in history: a detour through the no-man’s 
land or threshold area of counter-myth and symbolisation is necessary [.]”89 Furthermore, 
Antoni should certainly be viewed, not only an artist, but also as a writer. As such 
Barthes relates, “[w]riting is that neuter, that composite, that obliquity into which our 
subject flees, the black and white where all identity is lost, beginning with the very 
identity of the body that writes.”90 Antoni ‘writes’ through her absence. Her absence from 
the work allows the viewer to engage the work in a phenomenological way, becoming the 
“Author,” removing the singularity of authorship from Antoni. The “body” of the artist 
becomes inclusive. Identity becomes plural, shared.  
 
                                                          
88 Luce Irigaray, “The Sex Which Is Not One,” in  Writing on the Body: Female Embodiment and 
Feminist Theory, editied by Katie Conboy, et. al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 250. 
89 Laura Mulvey, Visual and Other Pleasures (London: Macmillan, 1989), 167. 
90 Roland Barthes, The Rustle of Language,49 
 54
Conclusion 
The myths Janine Antoni writes are in essence a type of history through which she 
interjects her own physical being, thus becoming a part of that history. Through her 
process of mythical speech, she decodes other myths of modernism’s past and dispels 
them while paradoxically forming her own, in a never ending search for self in a 
commercially driven society that desperately grasps the classical construct of beauty as a 
marketing tool and a societal norm. Unlike her predecessors, such as Sherrie Levine who 
used appropriated images or Cindy Sherman who used herself in appropriated guises to 
dispel the stereotypical myths of women and society, Antoni manufactures counter-myths 
in a duplicitous approach that uses the history of art to comment on gender identity. By 
placing Freudian ideas in the role of the signified through her actions, Antoni creates 
myths that remove her gender identity to reveal the constructs that support traditional and 
contemporary notions of femininity. The mythical sign that the signifiers of the Freudian 
signified feed into is not a conclusion, but rather a question of what Ellen Berkovitch 
refers to as the “nature/nurture symbiosis”91 inherent in her work.   
Antoni’s actions are operational. She directly ‘speaks’the myth without speaking 
‘of’ or ‘about’ myths. As Barthes put it, she “speaks the tree,”92 which forms a language-
object. Antoni ‘speaks’ the myth through her actions, just as the tree cutter ‘speaks’ the 
tree.  Her actions historicize the objects acted upon, and it is in her absence that her 
actions resonate, creating the second-order system of myth. The viewer through her 
absence is able to both imagine and conceptually continue her actions through the 
physicality expressed by the evidence of her actions upon her media, which are typically 
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‘of’ or ‘about’ the body. The media – chocolate, lard, soap and/or hair dye evoke the 
feminine, and with this evocation the female is alluded to, but not directly spoken of. This 
allusion forces the viewer to question the proposed ‘nature’ of femininity, the semiology 
of myth facilitated by the body politic, which relies upon what Foucault calls the “docile 
body” to reinforce its ideologies.  
Antoni’s actions are those of everyday activities of eating, bathing or mopping the 
floor.  They do not distance the viewer, limiting the Text. Instead, they embrace an 
“everydayness,” and in doing so the body politic is revealed through a recontextualization 
of these activities. Together, the viewer/participant and Janine Antoni ‘speak,’ creating a 
plurality that refuses the singularity and the Otherness of myth, through the paradoxical 
creation of a new myth based upon the historical actions of Antoni, not the body politic. 
Antoni’s works attempt to reveal the false conception of myth as being ‘natural.’ Instead, 
one recognizes that myth attempts to ‘naturalize’ norms that are social conventions of the 
dominant ‘voice,’ the body politic, through semiological structure. Antoni’s actions thus 
produce figuration, rather that representation.  
In certain works, such as Lick and Lather, Antoni juxtaposes figuration over 
representation to demonstrate representation’s semiological relationship with myth. With 
Loving Care, figuration is suppressed by the representation of Antoni in the work’s 
“documentation,” which in effect mythologizes Antoni’s efforts through a long, 
established “scopic economy” that reduces her to an empty signifier of the myth. Of the 
works discussed, only Gnaw produces figuration without the presence of a 
representational likeness or depiction. Antoni’s actions upon the minimalist cubes of lard 
and chocolate produce her “touch” upon the objects. With all of the works discussed, 
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however, the presence of Antoni’s “touch” is paramount in her ‘speaking’ the myth. It 
feminizes the myth according to Luce Irigaray who states, “Woman takes more pleasure 
from touching than from looking.”93 This creates an intimacy through figuration, an 
intimacy that representation denies due to its semiological structure. Antoni’s purpose in 
her mythical speech seems to be this intimacy of “touch.” She expresses this by stating 
the following: “My hope is that you as a viewer can feel that intimacy. That’s what a 
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